Introduction
The Kurdish people represent the largest territorially concentrated ethnic group in the world that does not have its own nation-state. Thirty to forty million Kurds live in a territory that is divided between Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq. They constitute between roughly a fifth of the population in Turkey and Iraq and roughly 10 percent of the population in Iran and Syria (see Introduction-The Kurds as Barrier or Key to Democratization). They are classified by the Minorities at Risk project as an "at risk minority" in all four of these nations, subject to varying forms and degrees of discrimination and violent repression.
1 Efforts at forced assimilation in all four countries have engendered among Kurds a strong sense of shared ethnic identity that has served as the basis for mobilizing collective resistance against policies that the Kurds see as a threat to their identity and their cultural survival.
In all four of these nations, this collective resistance has taken the form of multiple armed rebellions across the region by the Kurdish population prior to and since the end of World War II. None of these rebellions have been successful, at least in the sense that in none of these cases were the Kurds able to secede from the host nation and establish an independent Kurdish state. Nor have they been able to secure any constitutionally or otherwise legally sanctioned degree of autonomy as a result of armed rebellion. Only in Iraq, after the 1991 Gulf War and culminating with the overthrow of the Hussein regime in 2003, have Kurds been able to establish some measure of territorial autonomy, and that came as a result of two interstate wars, not as a direct outcome of their own armed rebellion.
The failure of armed rebellion-and the low probability of it succeeding in the future-to secure autonomy for the Kurdish people presents them with a grim dilemma. On the one hand, they remain subject to varying degrees of ethnic discrimination and repression in each of the four nations. Armed rebellion has not succeeded in gaining for them any degree of autonomy that would protect them against the fear of ethnic extinction. On the other hand, with the possible exception of Iraq, they have not succeeded in gaining any degree of autonomy or security against repression and discrimination through peaceful means either.
In Turkey and Iraq, the two countries that host the largest portions of the Kurdish population, Kurds remain caught in the struggle between civil war and democracy. Turkey has a democratic regime, but the Kurds are still officially in a state of rebellion, even though the level of violence has remained low since 1999 (see chapter 8). Kurds in Turkey are geographically concentrated in the southeastern region of Turkey. Their size and their geographic concentration should work to their advantage, both in mounting and sustaining an armed insurgency and in competing peacefully for seats in a democratically elected parliament. Iraq has a fragile democratic regime, but the level of violence there remains persistently high enough to pass most thresholds for what is or is not a civil war.
In Iran, despite the absence of a full-blown civil war, the lack of democratic channels by which Kurds can pursue redress of their grievances lowers the chances of a peaceful solution. While Iran has an elected president and an elected legislature, it does not qualify as a fully functioning democracy because the (unelected) Supreme Leader and Guardian Council exercise ultimate authority over the elected bodies.
Syria is currently in a state of civil war, a conflict that erupted when the pro-democracy demonstrations in the Middle East and North Africa, referred to as the Arab Spring movement, were met with brutal repression by the Syrian regime. This was not an armed conflict initiated by Syria's Kurdish population, nor is Kurdish autonomy in a post-Assad Syria (democratic or otherwise) one of the rebellion's primary goals. Instead, Syrian Kurds appear to be caught in the crossfire between multiple competing rebel factions, some of which are putatively pro-democracy while others with al Qaeda affiliation seek some other nondemocratic regime type. Autonomy for the Kurdish population is not a goal for any of these warring factions (other than the Kurds themselves). There was no democracy in Syria before
